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Lobstar Wilde trading agent sends ~5% of its token supply to a stranger instead of a…
PIR-2026-0043PIR-2026-0043id: PIR-2026-0043title: Autonomous Solana trading agent, its wallet-state context lost after a session crash, sends 52.4M LOBSTAR ($250K-$442K notional) to an X user who begged for 4 SOLdate_occurred: 2026-02-22 (transfer at 16:32 UTC)date_detected: 2026-02-22 (transfer public on-chain; the agent itself linked the transaction in its reply)date_disclosed: 2026-02-22/23 (agent's own X posts; press coverage Feb 23-24)status: corroborated (on-chain transfer + multiple outlets; internal mechanism rests on creator/agent account)agent_description: Lobstar Wilde, autonomous Solana trading agent built with OpenAI's Codex agentic tooling by OpenAI staffer Nik Pash as a public experiment: turn a ~$50K SOL treasury into $1M. Posts and replies on X; full autonomous control of a wallet that also held a large creator allocation of its LOBSTAR memecoin.operator_type: individual (employee side project, publicly attributed)autonomy_level: fully-autonomous (unrestricted wallet permissions, no human approval on transfers)model_stack: OpenAI models via Codex; exact models unknownharness: Codex agentic app, customauthority_scope: funds (~$50K SOL treasury + LOBSTAR allocation worth $250K-$442K notional), external comms (public X account)funds_at_risk_usd: ~300,000-500,000 (treasury plus token allocation; token notional soft - thin liquidity)blast_radius: one org (its own treasury), with token-holder spillover via the ~5%-of-supply transferroot_cause: plain-error (primary - transfer sized against a wrong mental model of its own balance); contributing tool-error (session crash reportedly triggered by a tool-call validation error, losing conversational/wallet-state context)failure_locus: agent-reasoning (harness contributing: state persistence failed across the crash)exploitation_status: in-wild-malfunction (the recipient's windfall was opportunistic, not engineered; bare "in-wild" retired in v0.2)mechanism: An X user asked for 4 SOL (~$310) for "my uncle's tetanus treatment," including a wallet address. The agent decided to send a small donation (~$400). Per post-incident analyses: its session had crashed and on restart it recovered persona from long-term memory but not wallet-state context - it no longer knew its 52.4M LOBSTAR balance was a ~5% creator allocation rather than small change (a decimal/unit misread of ~52,439 tokens intended is the competing surface explanation; state loss is the reported root). It sent 52,439,000 LOBSTAR to the address at 16:32 UTC. The recipient sold portions for roughly $40K realized before liquidity thinned; the token paradoxically rallied (~+190% reported) on the attention. Not an attack: an unforced execution error by an agent with unrestricted wallet permissions.adversary_present: no (solicitation present, but the loss mechanism was internal error, not manipulation of the agent)severity: lossdirect_loss_usd: 250,000-442,000 notional at spot - sources conflict (CCN ~$250K vs Cointelegraph $441,788; spot-price timing on an illiquid token). Economically realized extraction by the recipient: ~$40K.indirect_loss_usd: unknown; token price rose ~190% on the attention, muddying net holder impactdowntime: nonedata_exposure: nonedetected_by: agent-self (linked the transaction publicly) + third-party (on-chain observers)time_to_detect: immediatetime_to_recover: never (irreversible on-chain; no clawback; recipient kept/sold)remediation: none possible; creator and agent acknowledged the error publiclystructural_fix: none disclosed (no announced transfer caps or state-persistence fix)controls_that_worked: none - no transfer cap, no allowlist, no size-threshold confirmation; the absence of any bounding control is the actuarial facttelemetry_grade: append-only for the transfer itself (public Solana chain); operator-logs for the internal mechanismsources:independence: transfer independently verifiable on-chain; the session-crash/state-loss mechanism chains to the creator's and agent's own accounts. (All five URLs verified resolving, v0.2 pass 2026-08-15.)confidence: medium (high on the transfer and amount; low-medium on internal mechanism; USD valuation soft - all three named)